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CASE NOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Decision Implements Stricter Regulations for Modiﬁcations to Coalﬁred Power Plants, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423
(2007).
Whitney Marquardt*

INTRODUCTION
Between 1988 and 2000, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) modiﬁed and
subsequently operated eight of its coal-ﬁred generating plants.1 However, Duke
neglected to seek a determination from the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regarding a possible violation of the Clean Air Act (Act) prior to modifying
its plants.2 Consequently, twelve years after the ﬁrst modiﬁcation, the EPA alleged
the plant owner had violated the Act with the modiﬁcations.3 Furthermore, the
EPA claimed the plant owner could not challenge the regulations because the
requisite time had passed.4
In 2000, the United States brought suit against Duke at the request of
the EPA Administrator for a violation of Act.5 The disputed violation started
when Duke placed one of its power plant units, Buck Four, into Extended Cold
Storage (ECS).6 After putting Buck Four into storage, Duke developed a Plant

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009.
1

United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d. 619, 623-24 (M.D.N.C. 2003).

2

See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text describing how the power plant owner failed to
seek an applicability determination.
3

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 625.

4

See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 549 n.7 (explaining there was no
question regarding the validity, and, therefore, the time had not passed to challenge the regulations);
see infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (explaining how attacks on the validity of a regulations
must be challenged within sixty days after promulgation by the agency in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
5

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 622. The Clinton Administration investigated numerous facilities
for non-compliance with the current New Source Review (NSR) program. Thomas Gremillion,
Comment, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 336 (2007). The EPA
brought suit against thirty-two utilities allegedly undergoing “modiﬁcations” without permits; Duke
had eight such complaints brought against it. Id.
6
Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 624. During ECS, Duke continuously circulated dehumidiﬁed
air through the unit’s water, steam, air, and gas passages in an effort to protect the unit during its
inactive state. Id.
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Modernization Program (PMP).7 Consequently, the United States brought
suit alleging Duke’s PMP resulted in a “modiﬁcation” requiring Prevention of
Signiﬁcant Deterioration (PSD) review and permitting, and Duke failed to
obtain the required PSD preconstruction review and permit.8 Duke argued its
“modiﬁcations” fell under the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Replacement
(RMRR) exemption under the Act, and, therefore, exempted it from PSD review
and permitting.9
Duke based its arguments on the 1977 congressional amendments to the
Act.10 When Congress amended the Act, it created the New Source Review (NSR)
program, which included PSD.11 Congress designed PSD to ensure air quality of
attainment areas did not decline to the minimum level allowed under the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).12 This requires operators of facilities
in attainment areas to limit their emissions to a “baseline rate,” which is higher
than the minimum levels allowed under the NAAQS, and obtain permits before
a source’s construction or “modiﬁcation.”13

7

Id. at 625. Duke developed a plan to address a variety of maintenance, repair, and replacement
needs, and according to Duke, the PMP would allow a more safe, reliable and cost effective operation
for an additional twenty years. Id.
8

Id.

9

Id. at 626, 628; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(h)(1)
(1971). The EPA provided exemptions from the “modiﬁcation” rule for some activities currently
underway at already existing and operating facilities. Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628. Under the
standard, a modiﬁcation, did not include any “maintenance, repair, and replacement which the
Administrator determines to be routine for a source category.” Standards of Performance for New
Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (1975).
10

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628.

11

Id. Although, the NSR program has two parts, only PSD applies to this case. Id. at 628.
The NSR’s two parts consist of PSD and Non-attainment New Source Review (NNSR). Id. PSD
governs areas of the country with relatively clean air and NNSR governs areas of the country that
do not meet air quality standards. Id.
12
Id. Congress directed the EPA to develop NAAQS, which specify the maximum allowable
concentrations of air pollutant for different areas of the country. Id. at 627. Based on the levels of
pollution established by the EPA, States had to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) that
deﬁned source-by-source emission limits so each state could meet the NAAQS. Id. at 627-28. An
attainment area meets the NAAQS for a particular pollutant where a non-attainment area does
not meet the designated NAAQS for a particular pollutant. Id. at 628. Congress designed the PSD
program to maintain air quality in attainment areas and to not let the air decline to the minimum
levels permitted by NAAQS as a result of increases in total annual emissions. Id. Therefore, before
PSD, a unit could pollute right up to the limit set by the NAAQS. Id. However, after PSD a unit
subject to those regulations had to emit at a lower level than that established by the NAAQS. Id.
13

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628. Furthermore, when Congress enacted the PSD program it
explicitly incorporated the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) deﬁnition of “modiﬁcation”
into the PSD deﬁnition of construction/modiﬁcation. Id. at 629; see infra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text explaining the 1970 amendments. The 1970 Act amendments incorporated
NSPS to regulate pollutants (on an hourly emission rate) from both new sources and “modiﬁed”
sources. Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628. The NSPS program focuses on the “affected facility,” or the
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Congress also enacted § 307(b) of the Act, which it ﬁrst promulgated in
1955.14 This statute section binds future parties to ﬁnal agency action unless the
party challenges the action within sixty days after promulgation by the EPA in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.15 Congress has
directed that proper petitions for review under § 307(b) include any national
air quality standard, any other nationally applicable regulation, or any ﬁnal
action.16 Consequently, if a court determines a party did not properly challenge
the regulations under § 307(b), according to the Act that party waives the right to
challenge, and the court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the case.17
Although § 307(b) could have been an important point for the Court in
Duke, the Duke trilogy did not focus on the jurisdictional issue.18 Rather, the
overarching question was whether Duke should have obtained a PSD permit
prior to modifying its facility.19 The United States District Court for the District
of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of Duke, and determined
an industry’s routine standard should govern whether the RMRR exemption
applies.20 The court also determined the regulations allow a reviewing authority
to use the period most representative of normal source operations.21 Meaning, the
two years prior to a project do not have to establish the baseline rate, but rather
the most representative two years of normal source operations and emissions

affect on the particular apparatus. N. Plains Res. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 645 F.2d 1349,
1356 (9th Cir. 1981). Therefore, NSPS is equipment oriented. Id. On the other hand, PSD focuses
on the location of the plant and its potential impact on its surroundings. Id.
14

Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1955).

15

See infra notes 50-63 and accompany text (explaining the importance of § 307(b)). Section
307(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) are the same. Administrative Proceedings and Judicial
Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1977). The Act refers to this provision as § 307(b) and this note will
refer to it as § 307(b) as well. Id. In promulgating a rule under § 307(b), the rule must go through
notice and comment. Id.
16

42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1977).

17

Id. § 7607(b). However, if the party raising the objection can prove to the Administrator
the impracticality of raising the objection during the designated time after the period for public
comment, and the objection is too central to the outcome of the rule, the Administrator can
reconsider the rule and provide the same procedural rights as would have been afforded had the
information been available at the time. Id. § 7607(d)(7)(B).
18

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d. at 619; U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005);
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007).
19

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 626.

20

Id. at 626-35. The question is: would this particular unit routinely have this type of
maintenance during its lifetime, or would similar units in the industry have the maintenance done
only one or two times during their lifetime. Id.
21
Id. at 648; Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation
Plans, 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21)(ii) (1987).
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prior to a project.22 The district court did not address, and the United States and
Environmental Defense did not argue the jurisdictional issues under § 307(b).23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held Duke’s PMP
did not require a PSD permit.24 Furthermore, the appellate court found the EPA
must interpret “modiﬁcation” congruently with the New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) deﬁnition because Congress explicitly deﬁned PSD in terms
of NSPS.25 The appellate court brieﬂy discussed § 307(b), and determined a
question as to the validity of the PSD regulations did not exist.26 Therefore, the
appellate court’s only concern related to the correct interpretation of the PSD
regulation.27
The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and held
an actual, annual increase in emissions triggers the term “modiﬁcation” under
PSD.28 As a result, the Act now requires power plants to seek PSD review when
the facility undergoes a modiﬁcation that increases its hours of operation or
actual, annual production rates.29 In addressing the jurisdictional issues presented
in § 307(b) the Court concluded the appellate court’s construction of the 1980
regulations invalidated these issues.30 The Court also determined the invalidation
implicated § 307(b).31 However, because the appellate court did not reason that
§ 307(b) applied, the Court determined it had “no occasion at this point to
consider the signiﬁcance of § 307(b).”32
This note addresses how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “modiﬁcation”
supports the Act’s goals of controlling air quality.33 The note achieves this by

22

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 648. Meaning, the last two functioning years of a unit. Id.

23

Id. at 619. In the district court various environmental groups moved to intervene as plaintiffs.
U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 560, 562 (M.D.N.C. 2001). The court found the
environmental groups had a right to intervene pursuant to Rules 24(a) and 24(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
24

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 551 (4th Cir. 2005).

25

Id. at 550. The appellate court found it undisputed that prior to PSD the EPA’s promulgation
of the NSPS regulations deﬁned the term “modiﬁcation” to mean “a project that increases the hourly
rate of emissions. . . .’” Id.
26

Id. at 549 n.7.

27

Id.

28

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1433-34 (2007); Administrative
Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b) (1977).
29

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1433-34. If a unit increases its production of emissions this will
now trigger PSD review and permitting. Id.
30

Id. at 1436.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text describing the purpose of the Clean Air Act.
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looking at the Act’s initial goals, and more speciﬁcally the 1970 and 1977
amendments along with the subsequent 1980 regulations.34 The principal case
section addresses the history of United States v. Duke Energy Corporation at the
district and appellate levels leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision, as well as
the Supreme Court’s opinion.35 Furthermore, the analysis discusses two possible
improvements to the Court’s opinion along with policy considerations.36

BACKGROUND
The Clean Air Act’s Goals, Amendments, and Changed Regulations
Congress created the Clean Air Act (Act) to aid in the ﬁght against air pollution.37
Consequently, the Act directed the EPA to develop National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), specifying the maximum allowable concentrations of air
pollutant for each area of the country.38 In 1970, Congress amended the Act
to include New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), requiring the EPA to
regulate and minimize emissions from “new sources.”39 The NSPS regulates hourly
emission rates for both newly constructed facilities and “modiﬁcations” to existing
facilities.40 Moreover, the NSPS regulations require a “modiﬁed” source to become
subject to the NSPS’s “technology-based” standards requiring the installation of
the best demonstrated pollution control technology.41 Because of the cost and
difﬁculties in installing new pollution control technologies, the EPA made
exemptions to the “modiﬁcation” rule for activities currently being undertaken by
a facility.42 The ﬁrst exemption allows for “‘maintenance, repair, and replacement’

34
See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text discussing the relevant amendments and
regulations.
35

See infra notes 115-58 and accompanying text discussing the instant case at the district and
appellate level, and also at the Supreme Court.
36

See infra notes 159-228 and accompanying text analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision.

37

H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356; U.S. v.
Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
38

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 627.

39

Id. at 628. Congress deﬁned “new source” as “any stationary source, the construction or
modiﬁcation of which is commenced after the publication of regulations . . . prescribing a standard
of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.” Standards of Performance
for New Stationary Sources, 42 U.S.C § 7411(a)(2) (1977).
40
Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628. Congress deﬁned “modiﬁcation” as “any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increase the amount of air pollutant
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.”
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (1977).
41

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 2005).

42

Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(h)(1) (1971).
Congress wanted to allow older facilities to stay in operation without subjecting them to costly new
technologies. Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
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which the Administrator determines to be routine for a source category,” without
requiring compliance under NSPS.43 The regulations also exempt increases in
hours of operation or production rates that are not considered a “modiﬁcation” as
long as the increase is within the operating design of the facility.44
In 1977, Congress, once again, amended the Act to include the NSR program.45
This program included both PSD and NNSR.46 PSD requires operators of pollutant
generating facilities to limit emissions to a “baseline rate” and obtain permits
before “construction” or “modiﬁcation” of a source.47 A “modiﬁcation” includes
any physical change or a change in the method of operation of a stationary source
that signiﬁcantly increases the amount of emissions from a regulated pollutant.48
Therefore, according to the statute, a modiﬁcation results when a physical change
has occurred, and when emissions have signiﬁcantly increased.49

Section 307(b)of the Clean Air Act
Unlike many amendments to the Act, § 307(b) does not aid in the ﬁght
against air pollution; rather, Congress created § 307(b) to effectuate timely
challenges to ﬁnal agency action.50 Under § 307(b), when the EPA Administrator
promulgates, approves, or takes action that appears in the Federal Register, it
binds future parties.51 However, parties are not bound if a suit challenging the
regulations is brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

43

40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (1975).

44

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628; 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.2(h)(2)(ii), 60.14(e)(2), (3) (1975) (explaining
the deﬁnition of modiﬁcation). The 1975 NSPS regulations clariﬁed operating design as an increase
in the production rate of an existing facility that can be accomplished without a capital expenditure.
New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency 413 F.3d 3, 12 (C.A.D.C. 2005).
45

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2007).

46

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628. NNSR governs areas of the country that do not meet air
quality standards, while PSD govern areas of the country that do. Id. NNSR does not apply here
because the Duke facilities were located in areas of the country governed by PSD or attainment area
standards. Id. at 628 n.7.
47

Id. at 628.

48

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1429; Permit Requirements 40 C.F.R. §51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987). A
“modiﬁcation” is “‘any physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary
source that would result in signiﬁcant net emission increases of any pollutant subject to regulations
under the Act.’” Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1980)). Both
parties agree the 1980 regulations control in this case. Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
49

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 629. The preamble to the 1980 PSD regulations explained
companies do not have to obtain a PSD permit for mere increases in operating hours because that
would undermine the ability of any company to take advantage of favorable market conditions.
Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1435.
50
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356;
Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1977).
51

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1977).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss2/7

6

Marquardt: Environmental and Administrative Law - The U.S. Supreme Court's D

2008

CASE NOTE

543

Columbia within sixty days after promulgation by the agency.52 In § 307(b)(1),
Congress directs petitions for review for any national air quality standard, any
other nationally applicable regulation, or any ﬁnal action may be ﬁled only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia within sixty
days after promulgation by the EPA’s Administrator.53 Furthermore, § 307(b)(2)
states “[a]ction[s] of the Administrator with respect to which review could have
been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil
or criminal proceedings for enforcement.”54 Consequently, if a court determines
the validity of regulation, an authoritative interpretation, or a ﬁnal action is being
challenged, that court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the case unless that
court is the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.55
Although the D.C. Circuit has the power to hear these kinds of cases,
the judicial power to hear a case involving administrative agency action is not
inherent in the federal courts.56 Statutes grant the courts jurisdictional power, and
in the absence of a grant of jurisdiction, a federal court may not hear the case.57
Nevertheless, once a court has determined it has subject-matter jurisdiction, it
can entertain any cause of action within the bounds of the regulating statute.58
However, just because a court ﬁnds it has jurisdiction, this does not mean a party
has a cause of action and can bring suit.59 A challenging party can only bring suit
if it establishes a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or
the regulating statute.60 Although a party can bring suit under the APA, § 307(b)

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. § 7607(b)(2).

55

Id. §7607(b); Lower courts have often used § 307(b) to dismiss cases for a lack of jurisdiction.
See Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N. M., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1253 (D.N.M. 2003).
The Grand Canyon court held the proper approach to challenging the EPA’s decisions regarding
PSD permit requirements was through the judicial review provisions of the Act. Id. at 1254. The
court based its reasoning on three prior decisions. Id. at 1253. First, a district court refused to
recognize jurisdiction over a collateral attack claim on a permitting decision made by an agency. Id.
Second, a citizen’s suit did not allow a collateral attack on an EPA permit decision. Id. Finally, a state
court suit impermissibly made a collateral attack on a federal agency’s decision and disregarded the
court of appeal’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
56
Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Structure of the Judicial Process, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE,
2 Admin. L. & Prac. § 8.14 (2d ed.) (2007).
57

Koch, supra note 56; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

58

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979), on remand 612 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1979).
59

Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).

60

Id. The Supreme Court reafﬁrmed in 1999 that the APA does not create subject-matter
jurisdiction. Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1999). The APA
is the Act created by Congress that deﬁnes the procedural rights of people outside of government
and guides the manner in which decisions are made inside the government. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 22 (Thomson West 2006) (1997).
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does not use the APA to create a cause of action.61 Rather, it uses its own statutory
authority to create subject-matter jurisdiction.62 Therefore, a party cannot bring
suit to challenge a regulation under § 307(b) through the APA, it must do so
through the language of the statute itself.63
Not only does the D.C. Circuit have the power to hear these kinds of cases,
it also has the obligation to do so.64 This obligation is based on a 2006 decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court concluding a court cannot waive subject-matter
jurisdiction.65 Furthermore, the Court found all courts, including the Supreme
Court, have “an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”66 Because
of the importance in ensuring that a court has subject matter jurisdiction, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure additionally state a party can object to a court’s
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any stage in the litigation, even after the entry
of judgment.67 In the instant case, the Supreme Court found the appellate court’s
interpretation of the 1980 PSD regulations an invalidation of the regulations.68
As discussed above, under § 307(b) invalidations of regulations can only be heard
in the D.C. Circuit within sixty days after promulgation.69 Therefore, if a court
ﬁnds a party is challenging the validity of regulations outside the D.C. Circuit,
the court must dismiss on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction and not hear the
case.70

When a statute does not provide a party with a speciﬁc review provision, § 702 of the APA becomes
the fall back. Id. at 408. Section 702 establishes a cause of action for a person suffering because of
agency action. Id.
61

Funk, supra note 60, at 408.

62

Funk, supra note 60, at 408. Speciﬁc judicial review provisions can create both jurisdiction
and a cause of action. Id. Section 307(b) does not use the APA to create a cause of action, it uses
it own statutory authority in § 307(b)(2) to create subject-matter jurisdiction which applies to
§ 307(b)(1). Id.
63

Id.

64

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

65

Id.

66

Id. “Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction
over ‘all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.’” Id. at
505 (quoting Federal Question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)).
67

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506; FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6), (h)(3).

68

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1436 (2007).

69

Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1977).

70

Id.
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Applicability Determinations
As stated, § 307(b)(1) requires challenges to ﬁnal agency action be brought
within sixty days after promulgation.71 An applicability determination is one
example of ﬁnal agency action.72 In Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Reilly
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed just such
an applicability determination.73 Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO)
sought an applicability determination; however, when the agency issued the
determination, WEPCO sought review in the federal courts.74 When a party, like
WEPCO, seeks an applicability determination, that party submits a proposal to
the appropriate agency and waits for a determination.75 If the party is not satisﬁed
with the agency’s determination, the party may then challenge the agency’s result
in the appropriate court pursuant to the relevant statute.76
In Wisconsin, the EPA made an applicability determination as to whether
proposed changes at a Wisconsin power plant would qualify as a “modiﬁcation”
under NSPS and/or PSD.77 The EPA determined a “modiﬁcation” that increased

71
Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345. A petition for review of any EPA Administrator’s action
that is locally or regionally applicable may be ﬁled only in the United States Court of Appeal for the
appropriate circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1977).
72

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345.

73

Wis. Elec. Power. Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 905-12 (7th Cir. 1990).

74

Id.

75

See generally Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 901 (describing the process for an applicability
determination).
76

Id. In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, petitioners sought review from the Court
to determine if the EPA gave a permissible interpretation to the term “stationary sources.” Chevron
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The Court in Chevron established a two
prong test that gives deference to agencies. Id. at 866. First, when a court reviews an agency’s
interpretation of a statute that it administers, it asks whether Congress has addressed the precise
question at issue. Id. at 842. If the court ﬁnds Congress has addressed the question at issue, the court
defers to the congressional intent as law. Id. at 843 n.9. However, if the court determines Congress
has not addressed the issue directly, then the court does not impose its own interpretation, but
instead determines whether the agency gave a permissible interpretation. Id. at 842-43.
77

Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 901. During an applicability determination, the EPA makes a caseby-case decision to determine if a unit qualiﬁes for the RMRR exemption. U.S. v. Duke Energy
Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 632 (M.D.N.C. 2003). The EPA looks at the nature, extent, purpose,
frequency, and cost of the work, as well as other relevant factors. Id; Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 905.
WEPCO conducted a study and determined both its air heaters and rear steam drums needed
renovation to continue operation of its plant. Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 905. WEPCO submitted
the proposed project to the appropriate state agency, which then consulted the EPA to determine
whether WEPCO needed a PSD and/or NSPS permit. Id. at 905-06. A PSD permit means a unit
has to comply with stricter standards than the NAAQS, while NSPS means the unit only has to
meet the NAAQS standards. Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
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the facility’s hourly rate of emissions triggered NSPS.78 Conversely, to trigger
PSD, the “modiﬁcation” must increase the total amount of emissions.79
However, the EPA decided under some circumstances a unit can avoid
PSD.80 A unit can avoid PSD if the EPA determines that a project is routine,
therefore, qualifying for the RMRR exemption.81 To determine how routine
a project is, the EPA developed a multi-factor test in Wisconsin.82 The factors
included the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and cost of the project.83 After
weighing these factors, the EPA found the project at Wisconsin Electric Power
Company (WEPCO) not routine.84 As a result, the project did not fall under the
exception to the “modiﬁcation” rule, and the EPA required the facility to obtain
a PSD permit.85 The EPA relied on WEPCO’s potential to emit in concluding
the plant’s subjectivity to PSD review.86 The EPA also found WEPCO subject to
NSPS because the EPA determined the renovation projects would increase the
plant’s hourly rate of emissions.87 However, WEPCO did not agree with the EPA’s
determination and challenged the decision.88 By challenging an agency decision
with an applicability determination, a party can have assurance it has properly
interpreted a regulation and it will not be subject to litigation in the future.89

78

Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 905.

79

Id. Relevant exceptions to the modiﬁcation rule are: 1) routine maintenance, repair, and
replacements for a source category, and 2) increases in the hours of operation. Id.
80

Id. at 911-12.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 910. The EPA observed the substantial nature and extent of the
project, and, furthermore, that WEPCO wanted to perform an unprecedented project. Id. at
911. Additionally, WEPCO admitted they typically scheduled equipment changes and routine
maintenance simultaneously. Id.
84

Id. at 910-11.

85

Id. at 911-12. The EPA did not ﬁnd, and WEPCO did not identify, even one facility which
had undergone similar work. Id. WEPCO argued forty air heaters in other plants had been replaced
without NSPS and PSD review, but the EPA concluded the heaters at the WEPCO facility had to
be replaced in whole, while the other plants only replaced parts. Id. at 912.
86

Id. at 916. WEPCO appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 906. The
“potential to emit” calculation used by the EPA troubled the appellate court partly because the EPA
based its calculation on the plant operating continuously. Id. at 917. The court concluded the EPA
may not rely on assumed continuous operations as a basis for ﬁnding an emissions increase, and
thus the plant could not be subject to PSD review until WEPCO made data available to the EPA
so a determination could be made on whether the renovated plant would cause a signiﬁcant net
emissions increase. Id. at 918.
87

Id. at 914.

88

See Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 906 (explaining how WEPCO challenged the EPA’s decision); see
supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing which circuit is appropriate).
89

See id. at 901 (describing the process for seeking an applicability determination).
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A proper understanding of the law also created the central issue in Chaganti
& Associates v. Nowotny.90 In Chaganti, a suit arose, but, prior to trial, the parties
reached a settlement agreement.91 When it came time to execute the agreement,
the plaintiff refused to sign, and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held the plaintiff in contempt.92 The plaintiff argued the
court order did not identify all the required documents, and was, therefore,
unclear.93 However, the court found the meaning should have been clear based on
previous pleadings and discussions.94 Thus, the court concluded even if the terms
were unclear, the plaintiff had the “obligation to seek clariﬁcation of the court’s
order,” rather than maintain a studied ignorance of the law.95 Although the Duke
trilogy did not focus on § 307(b) nor applicability determinations, this issue is
important because Congress has shown a desire to utilize § 307(b) and ensure that
ﬁnal actions, such as applicability determinations, are promptly challenged.96

Statutory Interpretation
The district court in Duke, relied heavily on Wisconsin Electric Power Company
v. Reilly to conclude a routine within the industry standard should determine
whether the RMRR exemption applies.97 Conversely, both the appellate court and
Supreme Court in Duke primarily focused on the correct statutory interpretation
of the term “modiﬁcation.”98 The Supreme Court found the appellate court’s
reliance on the presumption that identical words must have the same construction
too rigid.99 In Atlantic Cleaner & Dyers v. United States, the Court found it
natural to assume identical words used in different parts of the statute required
identical meanings, but this presumption was not rigid.100 In Atlantic, the Court
reasoned most words have different “shades of meaning,” and can have a different

90

Chaganti & Assoc’s. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 2006).

91

E.g., id. (noting there are other cases which stand for a similar proposition).

92

Id. at 1220.

93

Id. at 1224.

94

Id.

95

Chaganti, 470 F.3d at 1224 n.2. Similarly, in Islip v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., the trial court
found the defendant in noncompliance with a permanent injunction. Islip v. E. Air Lines, Inc.,
793 F.2d 79, 80 (2nd Cir. 1986). However, on appeal, the court vacated the judgment of contempt
because the trial court’s orders failed to give the defendant a clear understanding of the requirements,
and the defendant had tried to clarify the ambiguous orders. Id. at 83. Since the defendant did not
maintain a studied ignorance, the vacated contempt order was proper. Id. at 85.
96

Brief for the Petitioners at 27-28, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2006)
(No. 05-048) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st]; Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24.
97

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 626-35.

98

See generally Duke, 411 F.3d 539; Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (discussing the correct
interpretation for the term “modiﬁcation”).
99

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1432.

100

Atlantic Cleaner & Dyers v. U.S., 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
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construction when used in separate parts of a statute.101 Consequently, if one
could reasonably interpret the words as having different meanings because of the
subject matter to which the words refer or the conditions in which one uses the
words, the “meaning well may vary to meet the purpose of the law.”102
Further emphasizing its point that identical phrases do not require identical
interpretation, the Court relied on the context of a statute to determine the
meaning of a term.103 In Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, the Court decided if a
term is ambiguous, standing alone, then analyzing the context to see whether the
context gives the term further meaning would resolve the dispute.104 Similarly, the
D.C. Circuit found in New York v. Environmental Protection Agency, that because
of the different regulatory deﬁnitions of the term “modiﬁcation” for New Source
Review (NSR) and New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) it would take a
strong indication from Congress it intended to apply an identical deﬁnition.105
The Supreme Court used the above cases to illustrate identical words may have
different meanings when the statutory context supplies different objectives.106

PRINCIPAL CASE
Summary of the Case
The United States and Environmental Defense sued Duke for an alleged
violation of the PSD provision of the Act.107 The parties brought this suit based on
Duke’s conduct over a span of twelve years.108 During this time, Duke engaged in
a Plant Modernization Program (PMP) to conduct maintenance and upgrade its

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997).

104

Id.

105

New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency 413 F.3d 3, 20 (C.A.D.C 2005). At the time of the 1977
amendments, § 60.2(h) deﬁned modiﬁcation to include “any physical change in, or change in
the method of operation of, an existing facility which increases the amount of any air pollutant;”
however, § 60.14(a) deﬁned modiﬁcation as “any physical or operational change to an existing
facility which results in an increase in the emissions rate to the atmosphere of any pollutant.” Id. at
19-20. Once again, in United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company, the Court found words
within different codes can have different meanings. U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
U.S. 200, 200 (2001). The Court found no direct relation between an identical term used in both
social security law and the tax code, and thus, the different context led the Court to conclude a
symmetrical construction of the term was not necessary. Id. at 212-13.
106

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1432-33 (2007).

107

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2003); see supra note
23 and accompanying text (explaining that environmental groups intervened as plaintiffs in the
district court).
108

Id. at 624-25.
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operating units.109 The case’s central issues concerned the appropriate interpretation
of the term “modiﬁcation” for PSD.110 Then, depending on the interpretation,
whether Duke’s maintenance and upgrades constituted “modiﬁcations,” which
should have triggered PSD review and permitting.111 Duke argued an hourly
increase in emissions triggered PSD, regardless of the effect on the annual emissions
rate.112 Conversely, the United States and Environmental Defense argued PSD
should be trigged by an actual, annual increase in the discharge of pollutants.113
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the term “modiﬁcation” does not require
the same interpretation for both PSD and NSPS, and the EPA’s actual, annual
increase in pollutants was the correct standard to trigger PSD.114

District Court
The district court decided two sub-issues.115 First, the district court determined
a routine within the industry standard was the appropriate standard to use when
determining whether a project qualiﬁes for the RMRR exemption.116 Second, the
district court found post-project emission levels should be calculated based on the
last two years a unit operated.117 The court granted summary judgment to Duke
and the government appealed.118

United State Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The appellate court decided the issue of whether a plant “modiﬁcation” that
does not increase the hourly rate of emissions production, but does increase the
number of hours a plant operates, requires a permit under PSD.119 The appellate
court found no requirement for a PSD permit as long as a plant’s hourly rate

109

Id.

110

Id. at 625.

111

Id.

112

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2007).

113

Id.

114

Id. at 1435-36.

115

Duke, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 626, 640.

116

Id. at 626, 635.

117

Id. at 648-49. According to the district court, a net emission increase can only result from
an increase in hourly emission rates. Id. The district court used statements made by Edward E.
Reich, the EPA’s director of the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement, in its ﬁnding that
increase in annual emissions do not trigger PSD. Id. at 641-42. Reich stated that only an hourly
emission rate would trigger PSD, and thus, the district court determined these statements deserved
substantial weight because Reich headed the division responsible for interpreting questions relating
to PSD. Id.
118

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 2005).

119

Id. at 542-47.
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of production did not increase.120 The issue of § 307(b) was ﬁrst raised in the
appellate court, but the court disregarded the argument.121

United States Supreme Court
The Environmental Defense appealed, and the Supreme Court granted its
petition for certiorari.122 The Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and
remanded the case.123 Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court was unanimous,
except for one portion, which Justice Thomas did not join for reasons explained
in his opinion, concurring in part.124 The Supreme Court considered the issue
of whether to measure an air pollutant emitted in terms of an hourly rate of
discharge, the way NSPS regulations specify, or whether the EPA can interpret
PSD with a different regulatory interpretation.125 The Court determined identical
interpretations were not required for the term “modiﬁcation” under both PSD
and NSPS.126

Overview
The Environmental Defense argued under PSD, a “modiﬁcation” should be
measured in terms of the actual, annual discharge of the pollutant regardless of the
hourly emissions rate after the modiﬁcation.127 Agreeing, the Supreme Court relied
on a more lenient rule of statutory construction and a different interpretation of
“modiﬁcation” for PSD than NSPS.128

120
Id. at 550. The appellate court used Chevron to determine Congress directly addressed the
question at issue when it deﬁned “modiﬁcation” in NSPS and then “expressly directed that the PSD
provisions of the Act employ this same deﬁnition.” Id. at 546. The appellate court’s conclusion that
Congress had spoken directly to the question at issue ended the matter under the ﬁrst prong of
Chevron. Id. at 547 n.3.
121

Id. at 549 n.7.

122

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428, 1432 (2007); Gremillion, supra
note 5, at 338. The Bush Administration declined to petition to the Supreme Court, stating that the
2002 NSR regulations made the Fourth Circuit’s ruling of little importance in a practical setting.
Id.
123
Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437. On remand, Duke can argue the EPA has taken inconsistent
positions and is retroactively targeting the last twenty years of practice. Id.
124

Id. at 1423, 1428, 1437.

125

Id. at 1430.

126

Id. at 1436.

127

Id.

128

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1423.
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The Statutory Cross-Reference Does Not Mandate a Singular Regulatory
Construction
Contrary to the appellate court’s interpretation of statutory construction,
the Supreme Court found the rule of statutory construction less rigid.129 The
Court reiterated that words have different “shades of meaning,” and can have a
different construction when used in separate parts of a statute.130 Furthermore,
the Court found it natural to assume identical words used in different parts of
the statute required identical meanings, but this presumption, the Court stated, is
not absolute.131 If the words could reasonably be interpreted as having a different
meanings because of the subject matter to which the words refer or the conditions
in which the words are used, the “meaning well may vary to meet the purpose of
the law.”132
Based on this reasoning, the Court found the EPA could interpret the term
“modiﬁcation” differently in PSD and NSPS.133 The Court found no “effectively
irrebuttable” presumption similar terms need identical interpretations.134
Consequently, the Court concluded that NSPS and PSD can have different
interpretation of the term “modiﬁcation.”135

PSD Regulations Cannot Be Interpreted Consistently With an Hourly
Emission Test
The Court further determined that basing PSD review and permitting on
an hourly rate of emissions invalidated the PSD regulations.136 First, the Court
found the 1980 PSD regulations did not deﬁne “major modiﬁcation” in terms of

129

Id.

130

Atlantic Cleaner & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932); see supra notes
100-02 and accompanying text (explaining the Atlantic case).
131

Atlantic, 286 U.S. at 433.

132

Id.

133

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1432. First, the Court examined Robinson where it held each
section of the Civil Rights Act had to be analyzed using the context around the term to determine
whether the issue could be resolved within the framework. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 343-44 (1997); see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (describing the signiﬁcance of
Robinson). Next, the Court used it decision in Cleveland Indians, to emphasize that similar terms do
not require the same statutory interpretation. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1433. In Cleveland Indians,
the Court “rejected the notion that using the phrase ‘wages paid’ in both ‘the discrete taxation and
beneﬁts eligibility context’ can, standing alone, ‘compel symmetrical construction.’” Envtl. Def.,
127 S. Ct. at 1433 (quoting U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001)).
134

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1433 (referring to U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 550
(4th Cir. 2005)).
135

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1436.

136

Id. at 1436.
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an increase in the “hourly rate of emissions.”137 In fact, the regulations gave no
rate at all.138 In addition, the Court found a unit’s actual operating hours should
be calculated using actual emissions, and actual emissions should be calculated
using the hours the unit actually runs.139 Therefore, according to the Supreme
Court, increases in actual hours of operations which increase the annual emission
rate of a unit should trigger PSD permitting and review.140
Finding that annual emission rate increases should trigger PSD, the Court
deﬁned “major modiﬁcation” as having two separate components that must be
satisﬁed.141 The ﬁrst component is, “any physical change in or change in the
method of operation.”142 The second component requires a “signiﬁcant net
emissions increase.”143 Finding two necessary components to the term “major
modiﬁcation,” the Court found the appellate court’s construction invalidated the
1980 regulations.144

137

Id. at 1434.

138

Id. The regulation only mentioned a rate in terms of annual emissions, not hourly. Id.
The regulations described “signiﬁcant” in tons per year. Prevention of Signiﬁcant Deterioration of
Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. §51.166(b)(23)(i)(1980). A “net emissions increase” for “actual” emissions
measures the “average” emission rate, prior to the project, measured in “tons per year.” Id. at
§ 51.166(b)(21)(ii); Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1434.
139

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1434.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 1434.

143

Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i)(1980)). The district court thought an increase
in the hourly emission rate was a necessary prerequisite to a PSD “major modiﬁcation” because of
a provision in the 1980 PSD regulations. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1435. The relevant provision
excluded increased hours of operation or production from the scope of a physical change or a change
in the method of operation. Id. Using this exclusion, the district court assumed that increases in
hours of operation, which result in a signiﬁcant increase in emissions, must be ignored if caused by
a physical change or a change in the method of operation. Id. The Supreme Court read the 1980
PSD regulations as requiring a difference between the two separate components of the regulation.
Id. The Court agreed a mere increase in the hours of operation was not a “physical change or change
in the method of operation.” Id. However, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s reliance
on the district court’s interpretation that an increase in operating hours, resulting in an emission
increase, must be ignored if caused by a “physical change or change in the method of operation.”
Id. The Supreme Court found this reading “turns an exception to the ﬁrst component . . . into a
mandate to ignore the very facts that would count under the second.” Id.; Prevention of Signiﬁcant
Deterioration of Air Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21)(ii) (1980).
144
Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437; Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review 42 U.S.C.
§7607(b) (1980). The Court aligned itself with both the District of Columbia and the Seventh
Circuit with its decision to vacate and remand the appellate court’s decision. The District of
Columbia in New York and the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cinergy Corporation both held
that an actual, annual increase in emissions should trigger PSD. New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
413 F.3d 3 (C.A.D.C 2005); U.S. v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Envtl.
Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (agreeing with both the court in New York and the Seventh Circuit).
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When the appellate court found that there was no question relating to
the validity of the PSD regulations for it to resolve, it dismissed the § 307(b)
argument.145 However, the Court found there was an issue relating to the validity
of the 1980 regulations, and furthermore, the appellate court’s construction
invalidated the 1980 regulations.146 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded the
appellate court overstepped its authority because invalidations of regulations are
addressed under § 307(b) of the Act in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia within sixty days of EPA rulemaking.147 However, since the appellate
court disregarded the applicability or effect of § 307(b), the Court found no
reason to consider the importance of § 307(b) in this case.148

Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote to address his grievances with the dicta in the portion of
the opinion stating: “[T]he statutory cross-reference does not mandate a singular
regulatory construction.”149 In Justice Thomas’s opinion Congress had explicitly
linked the PSD statute’s deﬁnition of the term “modiﬁcation” to the NSPS’s
deﬁnition of “modiﬁcation.”150 This explicit linkage prevented the EPA from
deﬁning “modiﬁcation” differently in each statute.151 Instead, Justice Thomas
used the presumption that repeating the same words in different parts of the
statute means the words have identical meanings.152
145

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 549 n.7 (4th Cir. 2005).

146

Envtl. Def., 127 S.Ct at 1436.

147

Id.; see also Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1980)
(requiring invalidations to be addressed within sixty days after EPA promulgation).
148

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1436. Duke’s ﬁnal argument was if the 1980 regulations entitled
the EPA to deﬁne PSD “modiﬁcation” as it had done, then the EPA has taken an inconsistent stand
and is “retroactively targeting the last twenty years of practice.” Id. at 1436-37. This claim was not
addressed by any of the earlier courts and the Supreme Court found it was an issue Duke can press
on remand. Id. at 1437.
149

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring).

150

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring). The cross-reference in 42 USC
§ 7479(2)(C), explicitly links the deﬁnition of “modiﬁcation” in PSD and NSPS and makes them
identical. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
151
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas found in Atlantic a word could have a different
statutory meaning if Congress repeated the word in a different context, but he distinguished
Atlantic from the instant case because Congress’s incorporation of PSD into the NSPS deﬁnition of
“modiﬁcation” demonstrated the congressional intent that both have the same deﬁnition regardless
of the context surrounding each. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); Atlantic Cleaner & Dyers v. U.S.,
286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). Thus, Justice Thomas did not ﬁnd Cleveland Indians relevant because
it analyzed the repetition of terms in different statutory contexts. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437
(Thomas, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice Thomas found Robinson inapplicable because there
was no contextual difference which implied a reason to deﬁne PSD differently from NSPS. Id. at
1438 (Thomas, J., concurring).
152

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to Atlantic, 286 U.S at

433).
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According to Justice Thomas, the Court explained why the instant case did
not require identical interpretations of the language in all situations.153 However,
the Court did not overcome the general presumption that the same words,
repeated in different parts of the statute, require interpreting the terms to mean
the same thing.154 Accordingly, the Court needed to explain further why the
general presumption did not apply in this case.155

Summary
The Supreme Court held the EPA was not required to interpret the term
“modiﬁcation” the same for PSD as it does for NSPS.156 The Supreme Court’s
decision sets a standard for what constitutes a “modiﬁcation” under the 1980
PSD regulations.157 This holding will no longer allow older power plant operators
to avoid PSD review by increasing their annual emissions, but not their hourly
emissions rate.158

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court made the correct decision in holding that older power
plants will now be subject to PSD review for any increase in their annual emissions
rate.159 The holding aligns the PSD regulations with Congress’s intent and the
goals of the Act.160 Although the Court’s holding effectuates Congress’s intent
in passing the Act, the Court should have dismissed the case because Duke did
not comply with § 307(b).161 Rather than taking the action that it did, Duke
should have invalidated the PSD regulations in accordance with § 307(b).162 Not
only should the Court have dismissed the case based on Duke’s non-compliance

153
Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1438 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas agreed with the
majority that the term “modiﬁcation” did not require an identical deﬁnition under PSD and NSPS.
Id. at 1437. However, Justice Thomas wanted the majority to further explain why this case should
be distinguished from the general presumption. Id.
154

Id. at 1438 (Thomas, J., concurring).

155

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

156

Id. at 1433-36 (majority opinion).

157

Id. at 1435-37.

158

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1435-37.

159

Id. at 1423.

160

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 333; U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627-28
(M.D.N.C. 2003).
161

See Chaganti & Assoc. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing
the importance of a party not maintaining a studied ignorance of the law); see Administrative
Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1977) (explaining how ﬁnal agency
action must be brought within sixty days after promulgation in the D.C. Circuit).
162

Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1253-54 (D.N.M.

2003).
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with § 307(b), the Court also should have dismissed the case based on Duke’s
failure to obtain an applicability determination from the EPA as to whether its
projects would trigger PSD review and permitting.163 A decision by the Court to
dismiss could have made this decision much more signiﬁcant.164 Dismissing may
have reduced litigation in the future by encouraging industry to take proactive
measures, and by aligning industry with the intent of the Act.165

Utilization of § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act
According to § 307(b) of the Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia may address a regulation’s invalidation within sixty days of
any EPA ﬁnal action.166 In this case, the appellate court did not consider the effect
of § 307(b) because it found that rather than determining PSD’s validity, it was,
instead, interpreting PSD regulations.167 However, the Supreme Court concluded
the appellate court did determine the validity of the regulations and in doing
this, the appellate court overstepped its jurisdictional authority.168 Nevertheless,
instead of dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Court did not address
the § 307(b) issue.169 Furthermore, it found no reason to consider the importance
of § 307(b).170 As it stands, the Court diminished the § 307(b) requirements.171
When a party wishes to challenge the EPA’s ﬁnal action, it must do so
pursuant to § 307(b).172 Section 307(b) gives a federal court, which has limited
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to hear a case involving a challenge to ﬁnal agency
action.173 In addition, a court has an obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists.174 Therefore, if a federal court has limited jurisdiction

163

Id.

164

See infra notes 166-221 and accompanying text describing how this case could have had a
more meaningful affect with a dismissal by the Court.
165

See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the goals of the Act).

166

Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1977). However, if
the grounds for review arise sixty days after promulgation, then a petition must be ﬁled within sixty
days after such grounds arise. Id.
167

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 338.

168

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1436 (2007).

169

Id. at 1436-37.

170

Id.

171

See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 553 F.2d 215, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(explaining when an issue comes before a court, it must determine if the validity or a particular
interpretation or application of a regulation is under attack).
172

Administrative Proceedings and Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1977).

173

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (2005) (noting U.S.
district courts are limited in their jurisdiction to the powers granted to them by the Constitution
and statutes).
174

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
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and an obligation to determine whether jurisdiction exists, that court should not
ignore the statute granting it jurisdiction.175 Nevertheless, this is exactly what
occurred in this case.176 Here, the Court only had jurisdiction to hear a case which
involved enforcement proceedings.177 Instead both the district and appellate court
heard this case and made a determination on the merits.178 This was inappropriate,
and every court along the way had the opportunity and obligation to determine
whether jurisdiction existed at the outset of the challenge.179
If a court ﬁnds itself determining the validity or a particular interpretation of
an agency’s regulations, the court must dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds
under § 307(b)(1).180 However, Duke argued this case did not involve a challenge
to any rule, rather the issue was the interpretation of the 1980 PSD regulations.181
Moreover, both lower courts only struck down the EPA’s application/interpretation
of the 1980 regulation, but did not invalidate the regulation itself; therefore,
Duke argued § 307(b) did not apply.182 Furthermore, Duke argued the EPA
never promulgated an authoritative interpretation or took ﬁnal action regarding
the NSR regulations, and therefore, Duke never had an opportunity to seek
review.183

175
See id. at 514 (asserting a court has an obligation to ensure it has the proper jurisdiction,
even if the parties do not raise it).
176

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 27.

177

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 27. An enforcement proceeding does not
involve a challenge to any rule; rather, it involves an interpretation of a rule. Brief for Respondent
Duke Energy Corporation in Opposition at 3, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423
(2006) (No. 05-848) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent, March 8th].
178

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003); U.S. v. Duke Energy
Corp., 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court did not
interpret the 1980 regulations, but instead invalidated the regulations by ignoring the two required
components of the deﬁnition of “major modiﬁcation.” Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1434, 1436.
179

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.

180

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 29-30. “[U]nless a petitioner can show
that the basis for his challenge did not exist or was not reasonably to be anticipated before the
expiration of 60 days, the court of appeals is without jurisdiction to consider a petition ﬁled later
than 60 days after the publication of the promulgated rule.” Id. at 30 n.21 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
95-294 at 322).
181

Brief for Respondent, March 8th, supra note 177, at 24. Duke argued the lower courts had
three different interpretations of actual emissions that the EPA had advanced. Id. at 16. Of the three
interpretations, Duke argued that both the district court and appellate court chose to uphold the
“actual-to-actual” interpretation. Id. at 16-17. The third test was an “actual-to-potential” test for
units that had not yet begun normal source operations. Id.
182
Gremillion, supra note 5, at 339; see also Brief for Respondent Duke Energy Corporation at
26, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2006) (No. 05-848) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondent, September 15th] (arguing the EPA’s subsequent interpretation of the 1980 rules was
improper, not that the rules were invalid).
183

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 339; see also Brief for Respondent, September 15th, supra note
182, at 26. According to Duke, the appellate court had the jurisdiction to review the validity of an
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Conversely, Environmental Defense argued any claim asserting the plain
language of the Act required an identical interpretation of PSD and NSPS was
purely a question of law (i.e. an attack on the validity of the regulation), and Duke
should have challenged it in the D.C. Circuit within sixty days as required by
§ 307(b).184 Congress created § 307(b) for the speciﬁc purpose of forcing parties
to challenge regulations shortly after promulgation by the EPA.185 Congress
wanted to avoid prolonged and conﬂicting adjudication involving nationally
applicable regulations and the Court could have helped to promote this interest
by a dismissal in this case.186
A dismissal in this case could have assisted Congress with its desire for
courts to utilize § 307(b).187 The desire became evident in 1977 when numerous
proposals gave Congress the opportunity to narrow the scope of § 307(b), but
instead Congress chose to expand the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C.
Circuit.188 Congress established this exclusive grant of jurisdiction based on its
desire to exploit the D.C. Circuit’s special expertise in administering complex
regulatory statutes.189 Congress worried if different circuits could rule on the
same regulation, courts could create uncertainty regarding the legality of the
regulation.190 Likewise, Congress desired assurance that regulatory programs

EPA regulatory interpretation which arose in the Fourth Circuit. Brief for Respondent, March 8th,
supra note 177, at 24.
184

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 29-30. Environmental Defense argued
that Duke had adequate notice of an authoritative interpretation in the 1980 preamble to the PSD
regulations published in the Federal Register. Id. at 31. The preamble stated that the focus of the
PSD program had shifted from “potential to emit” to “actual emissions.” Id.; Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 124). The EPA explained the departure from the 1979 proposed regulations, which would
trigger PSD if a unit increased its potential to emit. Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note
96, at 31-32.
185

Brief of the States at 12-13, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2006)
(No. 05-848).
186

Id. at 13.

187

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 27-28.

188

Id. at 27.

189

Id. Additionally, Congress established a uniform and ﬁnal forum which would make ﬁnal
decisions with the exception of review by the Supreme Court. Id. at 28.
190

Brief of the States, supra note 185, at 13. A number of states had reservations about their
State Implementation Plans (SIPs) based on the uncertainty of the proper standard for PSD after
the appellate court’s ruling. Id. Reservations of States regarding their SIPs was not Congress’s intent;
rather, Congress wanted to “‘avoid protracted and inconsistent adjudication over the validity’
of nationally applicable EPA regulations” with the creation of § 307(b). Id. at 13 (citing U.S. v.
Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985)). The appellate court’s holding made many States
hesitant about how to fulﬁll their obligation under federal environmental regulations. Id. at 13-15.
The concern among States was that the national PSD regulations they relied on to implement
their SIPs were illegal. Id. at 13. The Act’s judicial review provision is meant to ensure that the
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would either be followed or promptly challenged in the proper court.191 With the
creation of § 307(b), Congress did not intend for industry to not comply with
the Act’s regulations only to have them later invalidated by local courts during
enforcement interpretation proceedings.192 By not enforcing Congress’s desires
regarding § 307(b), this decision could lead to obscurity and uncertainty in other
areas of environmental law as well.193 Furthermore, if the Court had dismissed
this case and enforced a broad reading of § 307(b), it could have reduced both
uncertainty and waste of overlapping adjudication concerning environmental
statutes, and ensure that ﬁnal actions are promptly challenged in the proper
court.194

Applicability Determination
In addition to the jurisdictional issues presented in § 307(b), the Court
could have bolstered its opinion by addressing Duke’s behavior in neglecting
to obtain an applicability determination.195 Duke never sought an applicability
determination and instead waited until the EPA brought an enforcement action
before it challenged the EPA’s PSD regulations.196 Duke argued the EPA’s view of
the PSD regulations was an “enforcement interpretation” that Duke could not
have challenged in the D.C. Circuit because it was not a ﬁnal action.197 However,
validity of a regulation for national application has the correct standard before States must adopt
regulations to implement them. Id. If the appellate court’s reasoning became the standard, it would
have led to administrative confusion along with wasted resources to promulgate SIPs which may
have mistakenly relied on the validity of a federal regulation. Id. Furthermore, the appellate court’s
decision guaranteed, contrary to congressional intent, that federal Clean Air Act programs will not
have uniform implementation across the United States. Id. at 14-15.
191

Id. at 13.

192

Brief for the Petitioners, July 21st, supra note 96, at 29.

193

Brief of the States, supra note 185, at 15. By not dismissing the appellate court’s reasoning,
other areas of environmental law could be affected. Id. at 14-15. Other areas of environmental
law contain statutes concerning provisions similar to § 307(b). Id. at 14. Other possibly affected
environmental statutes are the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. Brief of Amici Curiae National Parks Conservation
Association and Our Children’s Earth Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 13-14, Envtl. Def.
v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2006) (No. 05-848). Time and time again Congress has
established a uniform system for judicial review for environmental statutes and a proper forum to
challenge them. Id. at 14.
194

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345.

195

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345.

196

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345. If the grounds for petition arise after the sixtieth day, then
the petition must be ﬁled within sixty days after such grounds arise. Administrative Proceedings and
Judicial Review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1977).
197
Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 2 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423
(2006) (No. 05-048) [hereinafter Reply Brief for the Petitioners, October 19th]. Section 307(b)
prohibits challenges to ﬁnal agency action during an enforcement proceeding. Gremillion, supra
note 5, at 345.
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even if this argument was substantiated, this should not alleviate Duke of its
responsibility to seek out the correct interpretation of the PSD regulations before
undergoing a PMP.198 Under the 1990 Act amendments and Title V Operating
Permit Program, self-monitoring and reporting is emphasized.199 Congress may
have waited until later amendments to stress the importance of industry taking
initiative and responsibility, but the 1990 amendment became effective during the
span of Duke’s PMP.200 Therefore, Duke’s “wait-and-see” behavior was something
the Supreme Court should have addressed in its opinion.201
The law has established a party may not maintain a studied ignorance of
the law, or just “wait-and-see” to postpone compliance.202 Arguably, Duke chose
ignorance to avoid costly compliance.203 Instead of plunging forward, Duke should

198
Chaganti & Assoc. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 2006); see supra notes
90-95 and accompanying text (explaining that a party may not maintain a studied ignorance of
the law). Chaganti stood for the proposition that if the terms of a court order are unclear, a party
has an obligation to seek clariﬁcation rather than maintain a studied ignorance of the law in order
to postpone compliance. Chaganti, 470 F.3d at 1224 n.2. The Chaganti case did not involve an
applicability determination, but it does seem realistic to apply the reasoning in Chaganti to other
areas of the law. Id. Accordingly, any uncertainty about the term “modiﬁcation” should have resulted
in Duke’s active clariﬁcation in the form of an applicability determination. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke
Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (sorting through the cloud of uncertainty surrounding the term
“modiﬁcation” in both industry and the agency). Because the EPA has limited time and resources,
it is industry’s responsibility to obtain the appropriate permit under the 1990 Act amendments.
Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345; Voices of the Wetlands v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 157
Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1268, 1299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). The 1990 amendments to the Act, mandate
that a new, modiﬁed sources obtain air pollution permits meeting uniform federal requirements,
such as a PSD permit. Voices, 157 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 1299. Additionally, Duke should have
consulted with the EPA before engaging in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of improvements.
Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345. If industry continually engages in this type of behavior, industry
will prove victorious because the EPA and other agencies do not have adequate funding to compete.
Id.
199
Peter Hsiao & Siegmund Shyu, Clean Air Act Litigation and Enforcement, ALI-ABA COURSE
STUDY MATERIALS, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION, Vol. 2 (2003). The 1990 amendment to the Act
by Congress created Title V. Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1299 (N.D. Ga.
2004). Title V’s goal is to impose stricter requirements on stationary sources in non-attainment
areas by implementing new operating permits for stationary sources. Id. Additionally, Congress
hoped to achieve ease in administration by creating a single document usable by the state and federal
government and the public to monitor compliance. Id.

OF

200

See Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345 (noting a party should not wait-and-see to avoid
compliance).
201

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345.

202

Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., v. Acme Quilting Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 800, 808 (2nd Cir. 1981). In
Chaganti, the court did not discuss applicability determinations, but it does not seem too far of a
jump to require industry to seek applicability determinations and no longer allow ignorance of the
law to postpone compliance. Chaganti & Assoc. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.2 (8th Cir.
2006).
203

See Hsiao & Shyu, supra note 199, at 2 (explaining that the 1990 amendments intended to
strengthen compliance with the Act because many were not complying).
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have sought an applicability determination before undertaking its ﬁrst project.204
This would have enabled the EPA to clarify, for Duke, the standard for triggering
PSD review.205 Furthermore, if Duke had sought an applicability determination,
it could have challenged the agency’s ﬁnal results pursuant to § 307(b) before it
engaged in a PMP.206
However, Duke did not seek an ofﬁcial applicability determination, but
instead insisted it relied upon statements made by Edward Reich that only an
hourly increase in emissions triggers PSD.207 Edward Reich headed the EPA’s
Division of Stationary Source Enforcement (DSSE), the lead ofﬁce responsible
for making applicability determinations.208 The statements Reich made were not
an ofﬁcial applicability determination; rather, the statements were the opinion
of one high ranking individual.209 Thus, Duke did not frivolously rely on Reich’s
statements, but the Supreme Court’s ﬁnding the statements were not “heavy
ammunition” illustrates the EPA’s needs to implement a rule regarding the proper
use of applicability determinations.210 Using the Act’s goals, the EPA could require
mandatory applicability determinations in some situations.211 A dismissal by the
204

See Wis. Elec. Power. Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1990) (seeking an
applicability determination to determine if its facility’s life extension project would subject the plant
to PSD review and permitting).
205

Id.

206

U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623-24 (M.D.N.C. 2003). Wisconsin
Electric Power Company (WEPCO) sought an applicability determination regarding whether or
not it needed to obtain a PSD permit for a life extension project it wanted to undertake at its
facilities. Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 905-06. The EPA determined that the plant was subject to both the
NSPS and PSD requirements. Id. WEPCO did not agree with this determination, and the company
brought suit in Wisconsin. Id. The Seventh Circuit had the jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) to hear
an appeal for the EPA’s ﬁnal determination. Id. at 906. The Seventh Circuit used Chevron, and
determined that the agency correctly decided that NSPS applied to the WEPCO project, but the
agency acted improperly when it subjected WEPCO to PSD review. Id. at 906, 909-11, 918.
207
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing the statements of Reich which
condoned triggering PSD for only an increase in the hourly emissions rate). U.S. v. Duke Energy
Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). If a regional ofﬁce could not answer a company’s questions
concerning regulations under the Act, the regional ofﬁce would refer the question to Mr. Reich’s
ofﬁce. Brief of Walter C. Barber as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondent at 6-7, Envtl. Def.
v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2006) (No. 05-848). The EPA has tried to have consistent
treatment of stationary source regulations. Id. at 9-11. The EPA has strived for consistency by
having one headquarter ofﬁce take the lead on applicability determinations. Id. During the time
period in question, Mr. Reich’s ofﬁce had that duty. Id.
208

Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11.

209

See Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11 (explaining Reich’s position within
the EPA).
210

Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1436. The Court found the Reich Statements unpersuasive with
“neither of them containing more than one brief and conclusory statement supporting Duke’s
position.” Id. Furthermore, the Court states than an isolated opinion by an agency ofﬁcial does not
authorize a court to read the regulatory language inconsistently. Id.
211
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5356.
Congress’s goals in implementing the Act were to clean the nation’s air. Id. When Duke did not
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Court could have drawn attention to this issue and encouraged the EPA to act in
the future with a rule regarding applicability determinations.212

Possible Future Actions by the EPA
Encouraging the EPA to act in the future with a rule clarifying the use
of applicability determinations could lead to less litigation and a proper
application of the law.213 Currently, industry does not often seek applicability

seek an applicability determination, tons of pollutants were emitted into the atmosphere for
years; however, the EPA could end this “studied ignorance” of the law by requiring applicability
determinations under the Clean Air Act. Id.; see infra note 213 and accompanying text (describing
when the EPA should require applicability determinations).
212

See Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345 (noting Duke never sought an applicability determination and the company should not be relieved of its responsibility to seek out an ofﬁcial EPA
opinion).
213

Gremillion, supra note 5, at 345.; see supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing
how when Congress implemented the Act, the goal was to clean the nation’s air). Pursuant to
the goal of the Act, Congress gave the EPA the authority to improve and protect the nation’s air.
Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1995). Mandatory
applicability determinations could aid this objective. See Wisconsin Elec. Power. Co. v. Reilly,
893 F.2d 901, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1990) (showing how applicability determination can lead to the
correct application of the law). Title V has lead to discussions of including mandatory applicability
determinations. Hsiao & Shyu, supra note 199, at 10. Accordingly, applicability determinations
could be incorporated into Title V as part of the permitting process. Hsiao & Shyu, supra note 199,
at 10. Currently, States administer the Title V program, but the EPA has extensive oversight. U.S.
v. E. Ky. Power Coop. Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (E.D. Ky. 2007). For example, the EPA
receives a copy of each Title V permit application and it then has the opportunity to comment and
object. Id. When the EPA objects, the state permitting authority may not issue the permit unless
it is revised in accordance with the EPA regulation. Id. The problem with the Title V program is
that emission facilities are divided into two categories, major and minor sources. HQ Air Force
Center for Environmental Excellence, PROACT Fact Sheet, PROACT ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GUIDANCE, available at http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/pro-act/fact/titlev.asp
(last visited March 9, 2008). A major source is deﬁned as a facility that produces more than onehundred tons of pollutant per year. Id. Some sources that have the physical and operational capacity
to emit large amounts of pollutants, can achieve minor status under state law, and, therefore, avoid
Title V permitting. Id. It is possible that if these programs were in place when Duke ﬁrst underwent
its PMP, it could have classiﬁed itself as having minor status, avoiding Title V. See id. (explaining
what constitutes a minor emitter). Consequently, even with Title V in place, a case similar to Duke’s
could arise. Id. Therefore, if a facility has minor statute, it should still be required to submit to the
EPA a proposal for the work at a new or modiﬁed facility and have the EPA make an applicability
determination. See Charles F. Mills III, Comment, Clearing the Air: Use of Chevron’s Step One to
Invalidates EPA’s Equipment Replacement Provision, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 259, 265-66 (2005)
(describing industry’s confusion relating to the NSR program). This mandatory applicability
determination process would be very similar to the process described above for Title V, with the
difference being that a minor emitter would be required to obtain an applicability determination
to ensure they are not a major emitter misconstruing the regulations. See Eastern Kentucky, 498 F.
Supp. 2d at 1012 (explaining the Title V process). Even though Title V was not an issue in this case,
a dismissal may have shown possible ﬂaws in Title V which could lead to future litigation. See HQ
Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, PROACT Fact Sheet, PROACT ENVIRONMENTAL
SOLUTIONS, TECHNOLOGY, AND GUIDANCE, available at http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/pro-act/fact/
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determinations.214 Furthermore, when industry does seek these determinations,
there can be ambiguity as to their meaning.215
The EPA could solve these issues in two ways.216 First, the EPA must standardize
the way it makes an applicability determination to create less confusion amongst
members of the agency and industry.217 It must also take steps to ensure that an
applicability determination gives a clear, ﬁnal answer that represents, not only the
opinion of one person, but that of the entire agency.218 Second, the EPA could
require that industry obtain an applicability determination when a facility does
not believe it is subject to Title V.219
Once again, a dismissal could have encouraged the EPA to implement a rule
that would require industry to take proactive measures to ascertain the applicable
law.220 In a case such as Duke, an applicability determination, early on, would have
avoided years of litigation and saved tons of pollutants from being emitted into
the environment because Duke would have installed the Best Available Control
Technology (BACT) as required by PSD.221

titlev.asp (last visited March 9, 2008) (explaining how minor emitters are not subject to the Title
V permitting process). As stated above, it is possible that if Title V was present when Duke ﬁrst
engaged in a PMP, it may have been able to qualify as a minor emitter, and therefore, avoided Title
V oversight. Id. This could result in the same type of litigation today as in the past. Id.
214
See Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11 (describing Edward Reich’s role in
applicability determinations). The district court and Duke used statements made by Reich, in its
ﬁnding that increase in annual emissions do not trigger PSD. U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F.
Supp. 2d 619, 642 (M.D.N.C. 2003). However, the Court found the Reich Statements unpersuasive
relating to PSD. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1436 (2007).
215

See Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11 (describing Edward Reich’s role in
applicability determinations).
216

Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11.

217

Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11.

218

Brief of Walter C. Barber, supra note 207, at 9-11.

219

See Hsiao & Shyu, supra note 199, at 2 (explaining that the 1990 amendments intended
to strengthen compliance with the Act because many were not complying). If a facility is subject
to Title V, the EPA will have an opportunity to review a facilities permit and monitor compliance.
HQ Air Force Center, supra note 213. However, if a facility can classify itself as a minor emitter, it
is not subject to Title V. Id.
220
Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1995);
see Wis. Elec. Power. Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1990) (seeking an applicability
determination as to whether it needed a PSD permit before commencing a repair and replacement
program).
221
U.S. v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623-24 (M.D.N.C. 2003). By becoming
subject to PSD in 1988, the year of Duke’s ﬁrst PMP, Duke would have been required to install Best
Available Control Technology (BACT); therefore, eliminating the amount of emissions it emitted
annually. Id.; Preconstruction Requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)(1980).
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Congress’s Intent for New Technology
New technologies have been discovered which signiﬁcantly decrease the
amount of pollutant emitted into the air while still utilizing coal.222 Use of new
technologies is exactly what Congress expected when it initially created the
Routine Maintenance Repair and Replacement (RMRR) exemption.223 Congress
expected older facilities to run only for a few more years.224 In creating the
exemption, Congress wanted to prevent older facilities, which would soon be
out of commission, from having to undergo costly repairs that would bring the
plants up to the current standards for air pollution control.225 Instead of this
exemption operating as Congress intended, facilities scheduled life extension
projects into their routine maintenance and identiﬁed them as rehabilitation
programs.226 Industry abused the RMRR exemption by making modiﬁcations
and not installing the BACT as required by PSD.227 Once again, an applicability
determination could have provided guidance as to whether a facility qualiﬁes for
an RMRR exemption.228

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s holding was correct regarding the substantive
law.229 The decision informed coal-ﬁred power plant owners of exactly what
222

See Lory Hough, King Coal Comes Clean, KENNEDY SCHOOL BULLETIN, summer 2006,
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/summer2006/features/coal.htm (last
visited September 6, 2007). Instead of industry wasting money on litigation, industry could apply
its wealth towards a new technology that has been discovered to burn cleaner coal in a process
known as “coal gasiﬁcation.” Id.
223

Mills, supra note 213, at 264.

224

Mills, supra note 213, at 264.

225

Mills, supra note 213, at 264.

226

Mills, supra note 213, at 268. In Wisconsin, the facility underwent a life extension project.
Wisconsin, 893 F.2d at 906. Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) submitted a proposed
replacement program, which it called a “life extension” project to the appropriate state agency. Id. In
its proposal, WEPCO explained that it had to renovate a unit to keep it operational past its planned
retirement date. Id. Professional literature has stopped using the term life extension project and now
refers to these projects as rehabilitation programs. Larry Parker, Congressional Research Serv., Clean
Air and New Source Review: Deﬁning Routine Maintenance, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, January
14, 2004, available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8199:1 (last
visited at February 9, 2008).
227
American Lung Association et al., Comments on the Proposed Rule: “Prevention of Signiﬁcant
Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): Routine Maintenance, Repair
and Replacement,” AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, ET AL., May 2, 2003, available at http://www.catf.
us/press_room/20030501-Final_Comments_on_Proposed_Rule.pdf (last visited at February 29,
2008).
228
See supra notes 195-212 and accompanying text (describing why applicability determinations
are important).
229

See supra notes 28-29, 129-35 and accompanying text (describing why the holding was

correct).
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constitutes a modiﬁcation triggering PSD review and permitting.230 However, a
dismissal would have emphasized the importance of the procedural requirements
of § 307(b) and sent a message to industry that any uncertainly in a regulation
must be promptly challenged.231 Furthermore, courts would know the importance
of watching for § 307(b) jurisdictional violations and promptly dismiss cases
they do not have jurisdiction to hear.232 With a dismissal, the Court could have
emphasized to the EPA the importance of ascertaining the applicable law with an
applicability determination and pushed the EPA in the direction of mandatory
applicability determinations.233 As demonstrated throughout this note, this
decision could have had a more meaningful and lasting effect with a dismissal
based on § 307(b).234

230
See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s reasoning regarding
the proper interpretation for a modiﬁcation under PSD).
231

See supra notes 166-94 and accompanying text (showing the importance of § 307(b)).

232

See supra notes 166-94 and accompanying text (demonstrating the importance of utilizing
§ 307(b)).
233
See supra notes 195-212 and accompanying text (explaining why the EPA needs to utilize
applicability determinations).
234
See supra notes 166-94 and accompanying text (demonstrating the importance of a proper
utilization of § 307(b)).
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